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Abstract
In 1980, seven out of the seventeen Spanish regions were devolved education
spending responsibility. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, which I show
to be particularly credible in this context, I evaluate the long term eﬀect of
this reform on human capital. I ﬁnd no robust evidence to corroborate the
theoretically predicted beneﬁts of decentralization. JEL: E6, E61, E65
∗This research was started during my PhD studies at the European University Institute. I thank
numerous seminar participants and Jean-Marc Robin, Frank Windmeijer , Eurequa at Paris I-Sorbonne
and the Institute for Fiscal Studies for hospitality.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a broad agreement among policymakers that decentral-
isation is a key element of achieving economic eﬃciency and equity at the local level.
Educational decentralization in particular is a popular reform theme of governments
around the world. Many diﬀerent, but often interrelated, goals drive decentralization
initiatives such as: increased economic development through institutional moderniza-
tion; increased management eﬃciency; redistribution of ﬁnancial responsibility; de-
mocratization; the neutralization of competing centres of power; and improved quality
of education (Weiler, 1993). In theory decentralization can substantially improve eﬃ-
ciency, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of service provision compared
with centralized systems and, eventually, improves coverage and quality. However, on
t h ec o s ts i d ei st h ed a n g e rt h a tl o c a lg o v e r n m e n t sm a yb es u b j e c tt o‘ c a p t u r e ’b yl o c a l
elites, wherein targeting performance and responsiveness to local needs may deterio-
rate. Hence, it remains an empirical task to assess the extent to which the beneﬁts
of decentralization outweigh the costs. Empirical work that convincingly measures the
returns to decentralization is diﬃcult because decentralization is usually accompanied
by many other changes. In addition, identifyin gt h ei m p a c to fd e c e n t r a l i z a t i o nr e q u i r e s
country level policy experiments wherein decentralization is (at best, randomly) un-
dertaken in some regions (or projects) but not in others; such experiments are however
rather scarce1.S p a i no ﬀers a ideal setting to evaluate the returns to decentralization.
1Some rare attempts to evaluate the relative beneﬁts of decentralization include Somanathan et al
(2006) and Jimenez and Sawada (1999).
2Following the decentralization low voted in 1980, only 7 out of the 17 regions were
devolved education spending responsibility. Exploiting this asymmetry, I assess the
long term eﬀect of this reform on human capital. A commonly alleged pitfall of decen-
tralization is that poverty, socio-economic inequality and lack of political competition
allow local elites to capture local governments (Bardan and Mookherjee (2005)) in
developing countries. Hence, by focusing on a developed economy I provide evidence
on what decentralization can achieve in a environment where these mechanisms have
limited rooms to operate .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the ﬁscal decentralization model in Spain. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
develops the empirical methodology and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2B a c k g r o u n d 2
Spain is presently divided in seventeen regions, called Autonomous Communities. The
Autonomous Communities have important expenditure responsibilities, but the cen-
tral government keeps under its control almost all revenue authority. The details of the
decentralization process were developed in a high level law, “Ley Orgánica de Finan-
ciación de las Comunidades Autónomas” (LOFCA) passed in 1980. During the early
1980s, each Autonomous Community developed and approved its own Statute of Au-
2This section heavily relies on Teresa Garcia Mila (2003) and Hanson (2000).
3tonomy, in accordance with the general principles of the Constitution and the LOFCA.
Two diﬀerent systems of decentralization coexist, the Foral and the Common regimes.
The Foral regime is instituted for only the Basque Country and Navarra, while the
Common regime is applied to the other ﬁfteen regions. Under the Foral regime the
autonomous communities have authority to raise taxes locally, whereas regions in the
Common regime have limited local taxing authority. In terms of spending responsi-
bilities, the regions of the Foral regime have large responsibilities covering almost all
sectors including health, education and infrastructure.
Under the Common regime, two alternative paths for devolution of education au-
thority are deﬁned, one slow and one fast. In particular, only the ﬁve high-responsibility
regions, were responsible for education (and health), attaining the same level of expen-
diture devolution as the regions under the Foral regime (see Figure 1).
These asymmetries respond to regional diversity in many dimensions, including
history, culture and language (e.g. the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). For
instance, some regions had in the past history their own forms of government and
still today their own language which in some way contribute to enhance a desire for
self-governance. In fact, until the early eighteen century, Spain was formed by a set
of kingdoms that were united by the person of the king. Some of these kingdoms
had their own political and economic institutions which were very diﬀerent from those
existing in Castille. A slow route was reserved for the regions that tended to be made
of artiﬁcially created communities that had no historic or cultural identity of their
own. Regional diﬀerences in levels of development are unrelated to the decentralized
4ﬁnancing schemes, with rich and poor regions in both the high and low responsibility
regions in the Common regime (Fondacion BBV (1999) and Garcia Mila (2003)).
Three aspects of the decentralization process need to be pointed out. First of all,
65 per cent of the instructional material taught in all schools remained deﬁned by
the Ministry of Education. Second, a block grant budget transfer to the decentral-
ized regional governments is used to pay for those newly acquired tasks and resulting
expenses previously controlled and paid by the central government ( e.g. education,
health, transportation). Hence, the decentralized autonomous communities establish
their own public expenditure budget priorities. Last, thousands of state bureaucrats
were transferred to the autonomous communities as power and resources were decentral-
ized. Consequently, in education as well as in other sectors that had been transferred,
there was a corps of experienced and professional administrators who were in place to
make the changes work.
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
I consider two measures of human capital: the illiteracy rate and the fraction of the
working age population with primary or no education3. The historical human capital
series covering the working age population were collected by Mas et al (2001). The
data set covers all autonomous communities (except the African regions of Ceuta and
Milia) over the period 1964-2001. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
3Unfortunately, the number of years of education is not available.
5Figure 2 and 3 plot the series of the average levels of the outcome variables by treat-
ment status and their diﬀerences over the sample period 1964-2001. The graphs depict
a general increase in education levels over the whole sample period. Both outcomes
follow a common trend over the sample period and the diﬀerences between treatment
and control regions remain relatively stable after 1980. In other words, this graphical
analysis shows no evidence that education has increased more rapidly after the de-
centralization law in the regions that were devolved education spending responsibility
than in the regions that were not devolved education spending responsibility.
This descriptive analysis is however only indicative. In order to more accurately
and precisely measure the eﬀect of the reform I next turn to a regression framework.
4 Emprirical Methodology and Results
Basic Speciﬁcation The basic framework consists in using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator which compares the outcomes in treatment and control regions before and
after decentralization. Formally, the corresponding regression reads as follows:
HCit = constant + α1 (post ∗ Ti)+β1post + γ1Ti + εit (1)
w h e r et h el e f t - h a n ds i d ev a r i a b l ei sh uman capital in autonomous community i in
year t, Ti is a treatment dummy for autonomous community i, post is a post 1980
dummy. The observations in the control and the treatment regions tend to move
together over time (see Figure 2 and 3). Hence, I will report standard errors clustered
6at the region level to correct for this correlation over time.
Ad i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is rendered credible by the fact that the average
levels of the outcomes are not statistically diﬀerent in treatment and control regions in
the pre-reform period and follow a common trend over the whole sample period. Hence,
in this context means reversion is not a serious concern. If pre —decentralization av-
erages were very diﬀerent between treatment and control regions, one could observe
a situation where the observed increase in education over time would be negatively
correlated with initial levels and this pattern would be observed in the data even if
decentralization had no eﬀect. Another factor that contributes to enhance the credibil-
ity of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is that to the best of my knowledge, there
was no other reform or important public intervention in the education sector under-
taken contemporaneously to the decentralization law that speciﬁcally targeted either
the treatment or the control regions.
Results Means of education for diﬀerent regions and periods are reported in
table 2. This two-by-two box is a useful tool to illustrate the identiﬁcation strategy.
According to these simple means diﬀerences, the illiteracy rate and the fraction the
working age population with no or only primary education fall more quickly in regions
that were devolved education spending responsibility in 1980 e.g. by an additional 0.75
percentage point for the illiteracy rate. However, none of these diﬀerences is signiﬁcant
statistically. Like the graphical analysis these results are imprecise due to the fact that
only a small part of the available information is used. Estimates of α1 are reported
7in Table 3. As I emphasized already, these results have to be interpreted in light of a
general and sustained increase in education levels over the whole sample period. Hence,
the purpose is to determine whether or not human capital accumulates more rapidly in
treatment regions than in control regions after decentralization. The point estimates
on (post ∗ Ti) are negative suggesting that decentralization led to a more rapid increase
in education in reform regions. However, the estimates are not statistically diﬀerent
from zero when the standard errors are adjusted to take into account the common
random eﬀect at the time*region level (there are signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level
when standard errors are not adjusted).
Generalized Speciﬁcation Estimates of α1using regression (1) are very conser-
vative because while the outcome variables cover the working age population, all years
immediately following 1980 are taken as treatment years. Indeed, since the outcomes
are stock variables for the working age population one should not observe any immedi-
ate or short —run eﬀect of the reform. Further, if there is an eﬀect of decentralization
on human capital, this eﬀect should cumulate over time i.e. it should grow larger
as more individuals educated under the new ﬁscal regime enter the labour market.
Hence, to more eﬃciently and precisely identify the long-term eﬀect of the reform,
equation (1) can be generalized to an interaction term analysis which incorporates the
fact that the eﬀect of education spending decentralization on human capital is delayed
and cumulative.
Consider the following relationship between human capital in autonomous commu-
8nity i in year t, HCit,and the number of years spent under the new ﬁscal regime nit
:
HCit = constant + α2 (nit)+γ2i + λ2t + εit (2)
where nit =(post 1980 Trend)*(Treatment dummy).
Results Estimates of α2 reported in Table 3 conﬁrm the previous results. More-
over, the results are qualitatively robust to assuming that the long term eﬀect of decen-
tralization on human capital follows a quadratic or exponential trend instead of a linear
trend. The eﬀect of education decentralization is also insigniﬁcant on higher levels of
education, in particular when considering the fraction of the working age population
with secondary or university education. Finally, all results are robust to assuming
1992 (i.e. the year when the ﬁrst cohort fully educated under the decentralized regime
completed 18 years old) as a threshold year rather than 19804.
5 C o n c l u d i n gR e m a r k : W h yn oE ﬀect of Decen-
tralization in Spain?
Exploiting the Spanish decentralization experiment in the education sector this paper
ﬁnds no evidence that decentralization of education to local authorities contributed to
increase human capital in reform regions. Two factors may have contributed to oﬀset
4Results available upon request.
9the impact of the reform. Firstly, the more rapid increase in education spending in
reform regions (particularly those of the high responsibility common regime) than in
non-reform regions after 1980 due to the block grant approach in allocating ﬁnancial
resources (Teresa Garcia-Milà (2003) . Indeed, rather than speciﬁcally earmarking
money for educational expenditures, all the ﬁnancial transfers for the public sectors
are lumped together for the regional parliaments to spend according to their own
priorities. As a result, some regions fund education at a much higher level than others.
Secondly, the national minimum curricular was not respected making it diﬃcult for
students to transfer from a school in one region to a school in another region. This
probably caused increased dropouts among migrant children.
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Figure 3- Fraction of the working age population with Primary or No 
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Primari or no Education (a) 65,51 18,23 646
Illiteracy Rate (a) 6,92 5,34 646
Notes: (a) proportion of the working age population
Table 2- Means of Education for Treatment and Control Regions
Illiteracy rate Primary or no Education
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Post-1980 4,9 4,89 0,008 53,64 57,15 -3,51
(1,46) (1,31) (1,96) (8,42) (8,82) (12,19)
Pre-1980 9,85 9,10 0,75 75,72 78,93 -3,2
(1,21) (0,87) (1,49) (4,52) (4,19) (6,16)
Difference -4,95 -4,2 -0,75 -22,08 -21,77 -0,31
(1,89) (1,57) (2,46) (9,56) (9,76) (13,66)Table 3- Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Pre-Post Decentralization comparison
Illiteracy rate
Primary or no 
Education 
(Post 1980 dummy)*(Treatment 
Dummy) -0,746 -0,308
(1,159) (2,283)
Post 1980 dummy -4,206 -21,773
(0,662) (1,785)
Treatment dummy  0,753 -3,202
(2,839) (6,214)
Nbr. Observ.  646 646
Note: clustered standard errors by region in parentheses
Table 4- Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Number of years under the new fiscal regime
Illiteracy rate
Primary or no 
Education 
(Post 1980 Trend)*(Treatment 
Dummy) -0,049 0,011
(0,088) (0,168)
Post 1980 Trend  -0,314 -1,766
(0,049) (0,142)
Treatment dummy  0,642 -3,44
(2,743) (6,108)
Nbr. Observ.  646 646
Note: clustered standard errors by region in parentheses